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I. INTRODUCTION
The process for negotiating and implementing the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”), the world’s first public
health treaty and the first adopted under the auspices of the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), has been characterized by novel
features of secrecy and exclusion that cannot be reconciled with
accepted norms of international lawmaking. The FCTC’s stated
objective is to progressively reduce tobacco consumption “by
providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be
implemented by the Parties at the national, regional, and international
levels.” 1 That goal has significant economic implications that impact
groups ranging from tobacco farmers to wholesalers to importers - yet
blanket bans on public and media access have wholly excluded
impacted groups from having any voice in, or even the ability to
monitor, ongoing deliberations. In a clear and unabashed exercise of
viewpoint discrimination, only favored NGOs that uniformly espouse
swift and universal eradication of all tobacco products without regard
to economic consequences have been exempted and allowed to
participate in implementation proceedings. Even more extraordinarily,
the FCTC’s “Conference of the Parties” (“COP”)—the international
lawmaking body charged with elaborating and implementing the
FCTC 2—has advocated increasingly strident measures designed to
render tobacco interests, and all who associate with them,
international pariahs who are not merely excluded from deliberations
but also incapable of speaking: to international negotiators, to
domestic lawmakers, or even to the consumers of their products.
You might be thinking that if all this has really been happening,
surely you would have heard of it before. But the truth is that the
aforementioned public and media bans have proven very effective at
discouraging mainstream media coverage of FCTC proceedings.
What news organization has the cash to spare to send a reporter
overseas to cover an event into which the reporter will not be
admitted, to write a story that is virtually guaranteed to be limited by
a near-total lack of access, concerning a treaty that few among the
reading public even know about? In addition, no one (myself
1. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 3, May 21, 2003-June 29,
2004, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter FCTC], http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework
/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F7B-BYAP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
2. Id. art. 23.
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included) particularly relishes the thought of speaking out in what
might be perceived to be a defense of highly disfavored tobacco
interests.
It is high time, however, that serious scholarship set anti-tobacco
prejudices aside and begin doing what scholarship at its best always
does: shed light on an FCTC implementation process that has
increasingly drifted in recent years from established norms of
international lawmaking, and critically examine whether the most
notable departures are justified. The time could not be riper for a
fulsome examination, as the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on
the Right to Food recently recommended that the FCTC be used as a
model for the negotiation of other multilateral health instruments,3
and in November 2016 the head of the WHO FCTC Secretariat
opened the seventh Conference of the Parties (“COP7”) with a
declaration that the sugar and alcohol industries should consider
themselves next in line for a similar international convention. 4 Before
the process is in fact replicated, a serious and scholarly examination is
warranted.
Scholarship concerning FCTC implementation is also timely
because certain delegations at COP7 began, for the first time, to make
serious objections to procedural and legal irregularities in the manner
in which implementation deliberations were being conducted.5 Many
objecting delegations at COP7 lacked the support of on-the-ground
legal teams because their countries could not afford them, forcing
them either to act without the benefit of legal counsel, or to rely on
partisan NGOs—or the equally partisan WHO Secretariat—for legal
guidance.6 These delegations deserve access to constructive scholarly
3. Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on the Right to
Food, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016).
4. Dr. Vera de Costa e Silva, Head of the Convention Secretariat on Tobacco Control,
Address at the Seventh Session of the Conference of Parties to the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3 (Nov. 9, 2018) [hereinafter FCTC/COP
/7/DIV/3], http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_DIV3_EN.pdf?ua=1 [https://
perma.cc/79UE-9LJA] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
5. A New Kind of COP with New Challenges, Framework Convention Alliance Bull.
No. 134 (Nov. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Framework Convention Alliance Bull],
http://www.fctc.org/publications/meeting-resources/cop7-bulletins/1496-a-new-kind-of-copwith-new-challenges [https://perma.cc/32GF-EHXU] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (criticizing
delegations for “raising procedural or legalistic arguments” and for “proposing provocative
new language when Parties were close to agreement on a controversial item”).
6. From the inception of FCTC negotiations, many countries with limited financial
resources have been able to send only one or two delegates to negotiating sessions, and have

672

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:669

criticism providing a less insular view, and that can place the various
novel features of recent FCTC implementation deliberations within
the broader context of standard approaches to multilateral treaty
making.
I am uniquely positioned—and perhaps uniquely responsible—to
shed some of the requisite scholarly light. From 2001 to 2003, I
served on the US delegation that helped negotiate the FCTC. Shortly
after the negotiations concluded, I published an article arguing that
the FCTC as finally adopted was substantively beneficial, yet was the
product of a “deeply flawed [negotiation] process” that was both
“broken” and “inefficient.” 7 I urged then that the broken negotiating
structure should not be replicated or used as a model for future
negotiations, predicting that doing so would result in further warping
of established norms of international lawmaking, and would in the
long run generate poor and perhaps even extreme policy results. 8
Having issued this warning, I left the stage of international
lawmaking for more than a decade and did not look back. Just ahead
of COP7 in 2016, however, I was contacted by the Reason
Foundation, which inquired whether I would be willing to revisit my
previous scholarship and analyze whether in light of subsequent
developments my 2004 predictions have essentially come true. This
Article is the product of that prompting, as well as a deep dive into
the last twelve years of FCTC implementation deliberations, to the
extent information on those deliberations could be obtained in the
face of the increasingly cloistered and one-sided negotiation process.
To be clear, I am not an epidemiologist, and this Article will not
opine on public health outcomes (although my admittedly amateur
view is that the experienced and dedicated public health officials who
dominate FCTC negotiations have adopted and promoted many
worthy ideas concerning tobacco control policy over the course of the
last decade.) I am, however, a student of and former participant in the
making of international law and it is from that perspective that this
article argues that the FCTC implementation process must be
reformed to incorporate basic norms of transparency and deliberative
process.

had to make do without legal counsel. See Gregory F. Jacob, Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 287, 290, 296 (2004).
7. Id. at 288-89.
8. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FCTC
As previously noted, the FCTC is the first international health
treaty negotiated under the auspices of the WHO, a venerable
international body established in 1948 that is dedicated to promoting
global public health. 9 The FCTC purports “to promote measures of
tobacco control based on current and relevant scientific, technical and
economic considerations.” 10 To that end, the FCTC’s self-declared
objective is to “provid[e] a framework for tobacco control measures
to be implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and
international levels in order to reduce continually and substantially
the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke.” 11 The
treaty thus expressly contemplates ongoing international and domestic
law processes to tailor and refine the principles set forth in the
framework convention for implementation and adoption at the
national level.
The FCTC entered into force on February 27, 2005, 12 and as of
the date of this Article’s publication has 180 parties. (The United
States signed the treaty in 2004, but is not a party because it has not
yet ratified it). 13 Article 23 of the FCTC established the COP to
continue work on the international aspects of FCTC implementation,
directing that it “shall keep under regular review the implementation
of the Convention and take the decisions necessary to promote its
effective implementation and may adopt protocols, annexes and
amendments to the Convention..” 14 The COP is also empowered to
establish (and has established) subsidiary bodies to help carry out the
COP’s work and achieve the Convention’s objectives. 15 There have
been seven COPs since the FCTC went into effect; the first was held
in Geneva in 2006 to establish rules of procedure to govern future
COPs, and subsequent COPs were held in Bangkok (2007), Durban

9. FCTC, supra note 1, Foreword, at v.
10. FCTC, supra note 1, Preamble, at 3.
11. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 3, at 5.
12. FCTC, supra note 1.
13. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Status of Treaties, U.N. Treaty
Collection, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IX/IX4.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNJ3-WZS6 ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
14. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 23.5, at 21.
15. FCTC, supra note1, art. 23.5(f), at 22.
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(2008), Punta del Este (2010), Seoul (2012), Moscow (2014), and
Delhi (2016). 16
The FCTC recognizes, however, that the on-the-ground work of
tobacco control must primarily be done at the national level, through
“nationally
developed
strategies,”
“national
coordinating
mechanism[s],” and “legislative, executive, administrative and/or
other measures” that are exclusively creatures of domestic law.17
Indeed, as my I argued in my previous article on the subject, the
FCTC is peculiar among multilateral treaties in that it “has
remarkably little to do with international relations, and primarily
covers matters pertaining purely to domestic law. Virtually every
provision of the treaty could be enacted into law by willing countries,
even in the treaty’s absence.” 18 The individual work of the sovereign
parties to the Convention at the national level is thus necessarily the
primary driver of treaty implementation.
III. DIPLOMACY AS A TWO-LEVEL GAME, AND FCTC
NEGOTIATION DYNAMICS
The fact that the FCTC is an international instrument that
addresses almost exclusively domestic law subjects has resulted in
markedly unusual negotiation dynamics. In his seminal article
concerning the application of game theory to diplomatic affairs,
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,19
Robert Putnam convincingly argued that “[d]omestic politics and
international relations are often somehow entangled.,” with
negotiators making strategic moves at one level (say, in international
treaty negotiations) primarily for the purpose of improving their
strategic position at the other level (say, in domestic law making).20
16. Sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/sessions/en/
[https://perma.cc/73WA-FDLD] (Mar. 4, 2018).
17. See, e.g., FCTC supra note 1, art 4.1, at 5 (“effective legislative, executive,
administrative or other measures should be contemplated at the appropriate governmental
level”); art. 4.2 (“at the national, regional and international levels”); art. 4.4, at 6 (“at the
national, regional and international levels”); art. 4.5, at 6 (“as determined by each party within
its jurisdiction”); art. 4.6, at 6 (“in the context of nationally developed strategies”); art. 5.2, at 7
(“a national coordinating mechanism”).
18. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 288.
19. See generally Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of twolevel games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
20. Id. at 427.
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From the outset, that dynamic has been fully on display in FCTC
negotiations.
Because the FCTC is the world’s first public health treaty and as
originally conceived was supposed to primarily entail the
development of model public health measures relating to tobacco
consumption, most countries sent their public health ministers as their
national representatives to negotiate the treaty. 21 This basic
representational structure has continued throughout the COP
implementation process. Consequently, virtually every aspect of
FCTC implementation is dominated by public health officials who
when they arrive at the COPs, get to step out of the pitched battles of
domestic politics they are used to fighting at home—in which they are
constantly required to contend with opposing forces representing
interests such as jobs, trade, intellectual property, and economic
growth—and step instead into a gathering of almost entirely likeminded individuals who bear similar scars from frustrating domestic
political experiences back home. 22
As it turns out—and as Putnam might have predicted— this
collection of public health ministers has shown a marked proclivity to
use the treaty-making and implementation process to achieve
domestic policy goals that they have previously proved unable to
convince their home governments to adopt through domestic
lawmaking processes. 23 Some delegations have even expressly stated
this intention, arguing that various treaty provisions should be
tightened or strengthened so that their home governments could not
interpret their way out of them. 24 These delegations, in other words,
are (at least occasionally) using the COP implementation process to
impose international law obligations on the nations they represent that
their home governments would on balance prefer not to have. 25 Small
21. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 290.
22. Id. at 297-99.
23. See id. at 297-98.
24. Jacob, supra, note 6, at 298 (“It quickly became clear that many of the delegates had
experienced frustration in the past in trying to persuade their home governments to adopt
strong anti-tobacco measures. These delegates saw the FCTC as an opportunity to do an endrun around their governments by inserting strong anti-tobacco measures into the Convention
and then relying on international political pressure to force their governments to join it. Some
of the delegates openly admitted their ulterior agendas, making plaintive appeals from the floor
of the negotiations that strong language be inserted in the treaty so that they could force the
hand of their government back home.”).
25. See id.
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wonder that such delegations regularly advocate for strict limits on
public access to, and media coverage of, their activities.
Two additional groups that also exert significant influence over
the course of FCTC implementation—the FCTC Secretariat, and a
coalition of more than 500 anti-tobacco NGOs that calls itself the
“Framework Convention Alliance”—have also demonstrated a
proclivity to use the FCTC implementation process for the purpose of
securing domestic law victories that had long proved elusive.
Although these groups have very little formal power in COP
deliberations, as they are not parties to the Convention and thus lack
the power to vote, their soft power is considerable. The Secretariat
sets the default COP agenda, and both the Secretariat and the NGOs
frequently draft the base working documents that subsequently frame
the deliberations of the COP and its subsidiary working group
bodies.26 Indeed, the power of the Secretariat and the NGOs during
implementation deliberations has been further magnified by the
absence of trained diplomats and lawyers from most delegations.27
Smaller delegations, already ripe for NGO capture because of basic
alignment of viewpoint, often rely almost exclusively on the
Secretariat and the NGOs for legal advice concerning treaty
implementation, even though both play a highly partisan role in the
implementation process and have a poor track record of providing
neutral and disinterested advice. 28
Like the COP delegations, the Secretariat and the NGOs are
dominated by public health advocates. 29 These advocates have
extensive scientific knowledge concerning the medical and
sociological consequences of tobacco use and the relative
26. See About the WHO FCTC Secretariat, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/secretariat/about/en/ [https://perma.cc/9DDA-XHF8] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2018); see also What Is The Framework Convention Alliance?, Framework
Convention Alliance, http://www.fctc.org/about-fca [https://perma.cc/X8T8-QU4N] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2018).
27. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 290, 296.
28. See id. at 297 (“I greatly sympathized with the cause espoused by the NGOs in
Geneva. Setting my own policy preferences aside, however, it is clear to me that it is not in the
interests of the United States to participate in negotiations where NGOs exert tremendous
influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right on matters of substance,
but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services available to delegates
with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly did not act as
disinterested legal advisors, and along the way more than one delegation was hoodwinked into
believing the NGOs’ all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.”); id. at 295-96
(providing specific examples).
29. See id. at 295; see also About the WHO FCTC Secretariat, supra note 26.
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effectiveness of various cessation strategies, but they have little or no
training in or knowledge of regulatory law, trade policy, intellectual
property, job creation, or other economic impacts of tobacco control
measures. Those, of course, are precisely the competing interests that
domestic governments typically must grapple with, analyze, and
balance in developing workable tobacco policy. From the perspective
of the Secretariat and the NGOs, the COP thus represents a unique
opportunity to sidestep the turbulent cut and thrust of domestic
lawmaking, and to instead make their case to an international supralegislature composed primarily of public health ministers that
fundamentally agree with them on all core issues.
IV. FROM OPEN MEETINGS TO MEETINGS OPEN TO THE
FAVORED FEW
In light of this tripartite, homogenous, coalition of the willing—
health minister delegates, partisan Secretariat, and aligned NGOs—
the one thing that might threaten to disrupt a steadfast march toward
adoption of their preferred policy agenda would be a reintroduction of
the voices of those economically impacted interests that have
historically provided a policy counterbalance in domestic politics.
Like many embattled interest groups before them, the anti-tobacco
coalition determined at the outset of the FCTC implementation
process that one of the easiest ways to ensure achievement of their
policy goals would be to simply ban all of the groups they perceive to
be “the opposition”—ban them from participating, ban them from
watching, ban their domestic governments from talking to them, ban
the public (which just might after all have been infiltrated by the
forces of the opposition!), and ban the media from covering the vast
majority of FCTC proceedings.
Perhaps most troubling of all, Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which
received scant attention during the drafting of the Convention, has
been weaponized and transformed into something it was never
intended to be: a mandate that anyone who dares even to associate
with tobacco interests be treated as pariahs who must be completely
excluded from participating in international and domestic lawmaking
processes relating to tobacco control. 30 Even Interpol (yes, Interpol!)
has been prohibited from providing input to the COP on combating
illicit trade in tobacco products, for the sole reason that it has the
30. See infra Part V.
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temerity to work with the tobacco industry to track tobacco
shipments. 31 And in the months before COP7, the Secretariat pushed
to force State Parties to excise from their sovereignly selected
delegations government officials with ties of any kind even to stateowned tobacco interests, expressly threatening to deny such delegates
diplomatic credentials and the ability to access or participate in
negotiating sessions. 32
While I am sympathetic to the core public health goals being
pursued by the anti-tobacco coalition, this article sounds a clarion call
of warning for those who care about the process by which
international law is made. Dislike of the tobacco industry should not
blind us to the deeply problematic means increasingly being
employed by the dominant FCTC interest groups to warp
international and domestic lawmaking processes in ways they believe
will help them achieve their short-term policy goals.
A substantial and growing scholarship shows that open decisionmaking processes characterized by transparency tend to produce
markedly better policy outcomes than processes that are hidden or
shielded from public view. 33 Indeed, the WHO is well aware of
transparency’s power. One of the WHO’s foundational governing
principles holds that “[i]nformed opinion and active co-operation on
the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement
of the health of the people.” 34 The WHO purports to champion that
principle by regularly advocating for transparency in the
implementation of public health measures. 35 Even the FCTC
31. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
32. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Maximizing Transparency of
Parties’ Delegations, Intergovernmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations and
Civil Society Groups During Sessions of the COP and Meetings of its Subsidiary Bodies, ¶¶ 714, FCTC/COP/7/30 (July 13, 2016) [hereinafter FCTC/COP/7/30].
33. See, e.g., Dov Seidman, The Transformative Power of Transparency, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2014) (noting that transparency improves healthcare outcomes); Jake Rosenfeld &
Patrick Denice, The Power of Transparency: Evidence from a British Workplace Survey, 80
AMERICAN SOC. REV. 1045 (2015); Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Jordan C. Kyle, Benjamin
A. Olken & Sudarno Sumarto, The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards
and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20923, 2015).
34.
Constitution of the World Health Organization: Principles, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO], http://www.who.int/about/mission/en/ (last visited February 5, 2018).
35. See, e.g., The world health report 2002 - Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life,
WHO, http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/ [https://perma.cc/CL9W-TM5L] (last visited Mar. 4,
2018) (“Trust can only be generated by openness. . . . [and]the public should be trusted to
respond rationally to openness.”); WHO calls for increased transparency in medical research,
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Secretariat recognizes that transparency is a virtue; it recently
published a report calling for “maximizing transparency of Parties’
delegations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental
organizations and civil society groups during sessions of the COP and
meetings of subsidiary bodies” so that industry attempts to subvert
sound tobacco control policy can be identified and avoided. 36 The
FCTC’s expert group has similarly called for “systematic and
transparent” analysis of evidence and for “coordinated and transparent
application” of treaty provisions. 37 A fair examination of the FCTC
implementation process, however, reveals that the WHO and the COP
have not remotely been practicing what they preach.
Rule 32 of the procedural rules adopted at COP1 state that
“[s]essions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held in public,
unless the Conference of the Parties decides that they shall be
restricted.” 38 The same rules apply to meetings of subsidiary bodies of
the COP. 39 In effect, these rules established a presumption that all
meetings of the COP and its subsidiary bodies should be public
meetings, unless circumstances justify the COP restricting them
through a consensus vote instead.
Rule 2 provides added meaning to the terms “public” and
“restricted.” Rule 2 defines public meetings as “sessions or meetings
that are open to attendance by Parties, States and regional economic
integration organizations that are not Parties, the Secretariat,
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations accredited by
the Conference of the Parties pursuant to Rule 31 and members of the
public.” 40 Restricted meetings are defined as those “held for a specific
MEDIA CENTRE OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Apr. 2015),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2015/medical-research-transparency/en/ [https://
perma.cc/FE3X-55CM] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018); Transparency during public health
emergencies: from rhetoric to reality, 87 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO]
614-18
(2009),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/8/08-056689/en/
[https://perma.cc/MKM7-P87Z] (last visited September 25, 2016).
36. See FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32.
37. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTF], Impact assessment of the
WHO FCTC: Report by the Expert Group, FCTC/COP/7/6 (July 27, 2016) [hereinafter FCTC/
COP/7/6], http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_6_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8TZE-KWBT] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
38. Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, R. 32, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2006),
http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop_rop_text_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/58UR-FFLT] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2018).
39. Id. R. 25(3).
40. Id. R. 2(10).
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purpose and under exceptional circumstances that are open to
attendance by Parties and essential Secretariat staff.” 41 These
definitions lend further weight to Rule 32’s strong presumption that
the COPs should conduct most of their work through meetings that
are open to the public, by limiting “restricted” meetings to those held
“for a specific purpose” and where “exceptional circumstances” exist.
At COP5, however, the proceedings of virtually all subsidiary
body meetings were conducted in a manner that did not conform to
these authorized formats. 42 Without amending the governing Rules of
Procedure, the COP implemented a new and unauthorized meeting
format that excluded the public and the media, but permitted favored
observers and NGOs to attend and participate.43 The justification
given for this departure from the rules was that the tobacco industry
might otherwise send observers to watch (yes, watch!) the
proceedings. 44 Exclusion of the public and the media was thus the
41. Id. R. 2(11).
42. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Possible amendments to the
Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties, at 3, FCTC/COP/6/28 (July 11, 2014),
(proposing amendment to Rule 2 that “would recognize current practice for subsidiary bodies
typically established as ‘working groups,’ where the public is not invited to attend.”);
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Report to the fifth session of the
Conference of the Parties of the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a
Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, ¶ 10, FCTC/COP/5/7 (May 11, 2012) (“On the
first day, the INB decided to continue its practice of the two previous sessions to exclude the
public from observing the proceedings of the INB.”).
43. Id. (stating that the newly defined “open” session format, which had already become
the “current practice for subsidiary bodies,” would allow only the following entities to attend:
“Parties, States and regional economic integration organizations that are not Parties, the
Secretariat, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations that have
observer status pursuant to Rules 30 and 31”); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
[FCTC], Report of the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC (2014),
¶ 165 (Oct. 2014) (“[m]embers of the media would be considered as members of the public”)
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_Report-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JM8RS8FC] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); Id. ¶ 166 (summarizing debates over whether the general
public should be permitted to attend even COP plenary sessions, in the face of arguments that
“the admission of persons with links to the tobacco industry could hamper, or in some cases
even threaten, the work of the COP”).
44. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Conference of the Parties to
the WHO FCTC, Sixth Session, Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings, at 18 (Oct. 2014)
(remarks of delegate Heyward of Australia) (“You will recall that at COP5 and some sessions
of the INB on the protocol of illicit trade and tobacco products, valuable working time was
taken up with consideration of whether to exclude the public from meetings. The decisions to
exclude the public were prompted by concern at large numbers of tobacco industry
representatives among public attendees, but had the effect of also excluding academics,
students, and other members of civil society.”); id. at 20 (remarks of delegate Ndyanabangi of
Uganda) (“We know from our history how members of delegations could not contribute
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only way to ensure that the tobacco industry could reliably be kept
out. 45
At COP6, an amendment to the rules was adopted to provide a
legal basis for this alternate meeting format, called “open,” which
describes “sessions or meetings that are open to attendance by Parties,
States and regional economic integration organizations that are not
Parties, the Secretariat, intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations that have observer status.” 46 Rule 32
was not amended, however, thus leaving intact the presumption in the
original Rules of Procedure favoring open meetings absent
“exceptional circumstances,” a “specific purpose,” and a consensus
decision to keep the public and the media out. Nevertheless, the
Convention Secretariat noted in a report issued ahead of COP7 that
“the last two COP sessions decided to close meetings to the public,”
and predicted a “high likelihood of another such decision by the
Parties in the forthcoming COP sessions” 47 And that is precisely what
happened, although no specific purpose or exceptional circumstances
were cited in support of COP7’s decision. 48
Nor is that the end of measures taken to minimize public
scrutiny of COP deliberations. COP5 ended the previous practice of
including in the summary records of subsidiary body meetings
“[e]ach speaker’s intervention,” which were recorded and provided
for the purpose of “obtain[ing] an accurate and detailed summary of
because of big tobacco being among the public, and we should not underestimate the power of
the tobacco industry, especially at a political level, that we may have some delegations who
may not be able to express their opinions because of the tobacco control efforts back in their
capitals. … I think until we have amended the Rules of Procedure and we are very clear that
the methods of screening are thorough, we should not allow members of the public to continue
attending the present session, because we may as well have members of the tobacco industry
within the public and they will hinder the discussions of the meetings of this COP.”); id. at 21
(statement of Mr. Solomon of the WHO Office of Legal Counsel) (“The fourth thing being
discussed is a proposal to adopt a decision that was taken in COP5 and at the
intergovernmental negotiating bodies for the Protocol, which would be to exclude members of
the public on an ad hoc basis until a decision on this matter is reached.”).
45. See id.
46. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Amendments to the Rules of
Procedure of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, FCTC/COP6(24) (Oct. 18,
2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/146108/1/FCTC_COP6%2824%29-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29XC-8EG5] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
47. FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32, ¶ 4.
48. Kevin Mooney, Taxpayer-funded U.N. anti-tobacco convention closes out the press,
WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/taxpayer-funded-unanti-tobacco-convention-closes-out-the-press/article/2606161 [https://perma.cc/CQE3-L984]
(archived Mar. 4, 2018).
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the debate.” 49 That change was significant because the vast majority
of the detail work of Convention implementation occurs at subsidiary
body meetings, and the detailed records allowed those not personally
present in the room to follow the course of the debate, and to know
which countries were responsible for the various proposals and
negotiating positions. The Convention Secretariat also proposed at
COP5 to abandon the required production of verbatim records of COP
sessions, labeling the proposal an “efficiency measure” even though it
was forced to admit that the cost to produce the verbatim records was
in fact quite small. 50 At COP7 the Convention Secretariat went
further, proposing amendments to the rules that would eliminate all
verbatim reporting of FCTC policymaking. 51 The COP adopted the
proposed amendment with respect to discussions and debates in
subsidiary bodies, although it decided to keep verbatim reporting for
the typically more anodyne plenary sessions. 52
V. PURIFYING THE PARTICIPANTS: ARTICLE 5.3 AND THE
TEST FOR TAINT AS A REQUIREMENT FOR ADMISSION TO
TOBACCO POLICY DELIBERATIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL LEVEL
Since the FCTC went into force, the WHO FCTC Secretariat and
aligned NGOs have waged an open campaign to adopt highly
aggressive interpretations of the FCTC and its procedural rules
intended to isolate disfavored tobacco interests and completely ban
them from all forms of participation in public policy debates, at both
the international and the domestic level. Dr. Vera da Costa e Silva,
49. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Proposed workplan and
budget for the financial period 2014–2015, FCTC/COP/5/23 (Sept. 4, 2012) [hereinafter
FCTC/COP/5/23], http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC_COP5_23-en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PKE3-3BF7] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); see also Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control [FCTC], Performance report for the 2010–2011 workplan and budget,
FCTC/COP/5/19 (June 30, 2012), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75815/1/FCTC
_COP5_19-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD3R-F3YR] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
50. FCTC/COP/5/23, supra note 49, ¶ 20. The Secretariat acknowledged that “the actual
cost of the production of the verbatim records as currently produced may not be seen as
significant . . . because it normally represents approximately US$ 20,000–US$ 25,000,
excluding costs for printing and dispatch.” Id.
51. FCTC, Possible amendments, supra note 42.
52. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Report of the seventh session
of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, at 121-22, FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3 (Nov.
2016), http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FINAL_COP7_REPORT_EN.pdf?ua=1 [https://
perma.cc/HB4D-UMAS] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
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Head of the Convention Secretariat, made this approach plain in her
opening speech to COP7:
There is another observer here too, although its representatives
may not always wear badges. The tobacco industry takes a very
keen interest in COP meetings and makes every effort to
insinuate itself into delegations and proceedings. If anyone
doubts the importance of what we do here, always remember the
industry’s malevolent presence and the strong need for
transparency. 53

(Transparency for tobacco interests, that is—not for the Secretariat,
the NGOs, or the COP.) The Framework Convention Alliance echoed
a similar sentiment in its closing words for COP7, lamenting
“delegates who are faced with tobacco industry interference in their
home countries”—“interference” being the term that the Alliance
regularly use to describe any expression of opposing viewpoints. 54
In recent years, Article 5.3 of the FCTC has emerged as the
primary international law weapon of those seeking to gag and exclude
tobacco interests. As one NGO put it, “the FCTC includes a critical
provision—Article 5.3—that recognizes the tobacco industry’s
irreconcilable conflict of interest with public health. The article is the
backbone of the treaty; the treaty cannot succeed if industry
interference is not rooted out.” 55 Not expressly stated, but implicit in
these strategies, is the knowledge that it is far easier to win a policy
debate if there is no opposing interest—for example, no poor tobacco
farmer whose livelihood is at risk of being lost if policy changes are
implemented without due regard for transitional needs—to express
economic, due process, free speech, liberty, or other similar concerns.
Article 5.3 is a markedly strange choice of vehicle for such a
campaign of silence, as the unassuming provision received scant
attention during the FCTC negotiations. As adopted, Article 5.3
provides that “[i]n setting and implementing their public health
policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect
these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the

53. See FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3, supra note 4.
54. See Framework Convention Alliance Bull, supra note 5.
55. See, e.g., Roadmap to Protecting Health from Big Tobacco, CORP.ACCOUNTABILITY
INT’L (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter CAI Roadmap], https://www.corporateaccountability.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/map_booklet_en_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9C2-ZB4H] (archived
Mar. 4, 2018)
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tobacco industry in accordance with national law.” 56 Although this
language was amended a handful of times during the course of the
treaty negotiations, Article 5.3 was never viewed by negotiators as
establishing one of the treaty’s core substantive obligations, and no
INB breakout sessions were dedicated to shaping its language. 57
In the consolidated Chair’s Text released ahead of INB5, Article
5.3’s precursor provided that “[i]n setting and implementing their
public health policies, the Parties shall avoid harmful interference by
the tobacco industry.” 58 That language was considered too strong by
many delegations, particularly those with national constitutions that
mandate transparent governance processes and vest all lawful
stakeholders with civic participation rights. Article 5.3 was
accordingly softened in its final version by removing the terms
“avoid,” “harmful,” and “interference” from the Chair’s Text, and by
adding the expressly stated limitation that protective measures
adopted pursuant to Article 5.3 need only be implemented “in
accordance with national law.” 59
No delegation participating in the INBs ever suggested that
Article 5.3 should be read to mandate a general ban on all tobacco
industry participation in (or even passive observation of!)
international and domestic policymaking relating to tobacco control.60
Such a provision could never have been adopted, and the final text
says nothing of the sort. 61 The final language of Article 5.3 is,
however, not a model of clarity, and advocates (led by the Secretariat
and the NGOs) have stepped into the interpretive void and twisted the
nebulous provision’s meaning beyond recognition to serve their own
ends.
Most prominent among the official FCTC documents that
purport to interpret and implement Article 5.3 are the “Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on
56. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 5.3.
57. A review of the records of the FCTC’s INB breakout sessions reveals that none were
dedicated to shaping Article 5.3. Assertions in the text about the views of the FCTC
negotiators are supported by the absence of contrary statements in the negotiating records, as
well as by the author’s own personal observations as one of the FCTC negotiators.
58. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Guidelines for implementation
of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Oct. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Art. 5.3 Guidelines], http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6AC-7W86] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
59. Compare FCTC, supra note 1, art 5.3, at 7, with Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58.
60. See supra note 57.
61. The text of Article 5.3 speaks for itself. Otherwise, see supra note 57.
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Tobacco Control” (“Article 5.3 Guidelines”) which were drafted
between COP2 and COP3, 62 and were adopted by the COP in
November 2008. 63 The Article 5.3 Guidelines call for, inter alia,
“establish[ing] measures to limit interactions with the tobacco
industry and ensure the transparency of those interactions that occur,”
“denormaliz[ing] and, to the extent possible, regulat[ing] activities
described as ‘socially responsible’ by the tobacco industry, including
but not limited to activities described as ‘corporate social
responsibility,’” and “reject[ing] partnerships and non-binding or nonenforceable agreements with the tobacco industry.” 64 According to
the Article 5.3 Guidelines, these and its multitude of other
recommended measures “aim at protecting against interference not
only by the tobacco industry but also, as appropriate, by organizations
and individuals that work to further the interests of the tobacco
industry.” 65
A.

Application of Article 5.3 to Achieve Purity and Isolation at the
International Level

The various measures recommended in the Article 5.3
Guidelines and similar FCTC implementation documents are neither
mandatory nor binding. Their quasi-official status, however, has lent
an air of credibility to hardline advocates who maintain that Article
5.3 prohibits Parties from allowing both their international
delegations and their domestic governments to lend an ear to tobacco
interests. For example, when COP6 began to consider how to provide
economically viable alternatives to tobacco farmers who depend on
growing and selling tobacco to survive, international farming
associations were outright excluded from providing input of any kind,
solely because they had an economic interest in tobacco farming. 66 Of
62. Framework
Convention
on
Tobacco
Control
[FCTC],
Decisions,
A/FCTC/COP/2/DIV/9 (Sept. 20, 2007), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC_COP2_
DIV9-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU25-EA2W] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
63. Id.
64. Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶ 17.
65. Id. ¶ 11.
66. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Decision, at 1, FCTC/
COP6(2) (Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter COP6(2)] (rejecting the application of the World
Farmer’s Organization for observer status); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
[FCTC], Applications for the status of observer to the Conference of the Parties, at 3,
FCTC/COP/6/3 (June 25, 2014) (describing the World Farmer Organization’s economic
interests in the COP deliberations); Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings, supra note 44, at
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course they did! Much as labor unions have an economic interest in
international labor policy—yet one could hardly imagine attempting
to exclude unions (or business interests, for that matter) from
participating in International Labour Organization (“ILO”)
deliberations, solely because they have an economic interest in the
matters under discussion. Economic interests should of course always
be transparently disclosed so that conflicts of interest can be identified
and considered when crafting policy, but it is senseless for
policymakers to cut themselves off entirely from useful sources of
data and information. And while advocates such as Dr. da Costa e
Silva and the Convention Secretariat are of course free to label
tobacco farmers a “malevolent” force if they wish, 67 even such
disfavored groups have civil rights of participation and association
that are guaranteed by (among other treaties and conventions), the
10 (remarks of delegate Mishra of India) (“I speak on behalf of the South-East Asia Region.
As far as the farmers’ organization is concerned, we need to be a little guarded in the matter. In
our view, the acceptance of the application from the organization at this stage, without
adequate safeguards and mechanisms to ensure that there is no association with the tobacco
industry, may be premature. We would like to clarify that the issues of engaging and helping
farmers in the context of policy options and guidelines under Articles 17 and 18 are important,
and need to be carefully considered. However, we need to block the entry of the tobacco
industry in any manner whatsoever and therefore this decision to accept the application of the
World Farmers Organization for conferring the status of observer may perhaps presently be
premature.”); id. at 14 (remarks of delegate Kiptui of Kenya) (“The concerns that we have
with this application as the African Region is that it is just a farmer organization, and as
Uganda earlier mentioned, there is a risk of the tobacco industry entering through this
organization, it is the opinion of the African Region that it is rejected until it proves that it has
interest in tobacco control and not to intervene as a farmer organization, pushing the interest of
tobacco farmers. Secondly, this organization has no information on tobacco control activities
or even examples of diversification, and they have not proved to have any expertise in
supporting diversification of tobacco farmers to healthier and more profitable crops or
alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers, and therefore we propose that it be rejected until a
point where they have actually evidence and proof that they want to support tobacco control,
and they can have demonstrable evidence of the work they have done, then it can be
considered at that time.”); id. (adopting Kenya’s proposal to reject the World Farmers
Organization’s application).
67. See Address by Dr. Vera da Costa e Silva, supra note 4. See also Model policy for
agencies of the United Nations system on preventing tobacco industry interference, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] TASK FORCE, http://www.who.int/ncds/un-taskforce/events/model-policy-agencies-united-nations1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5XH-3RFK]
(archived Mar. 4, 2018) (defining “tobacco industry” to include “tobacco growers,
manufacturers, wholesale distributors and importers of tobacco products, including Stateowned, as well as lobbyists and associations”); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
[FCTC], Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC (July 27, 2016),
http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_7_EN.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/CR8LV8DV] (archived Mar. 19, 2018).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 68 These fundamental
international law guarantees have been given next to no weight in
COP proceedings, however; when a group of tobacco farmers showed
up outside of the COP7 meetings in Delhi to peaceably protest their
continuing exclusion from deliberations, the Convention Secretariat
called upon security to round them up and bus them miles away, to a
location where COP delegates could neither hear nor see them.69
For the most extreme anti-tobacco advocates, it has not been
enough merely to silence impacted groups from having a voice in
policy debates. These advocates have pushed for a substantially
deeper level of isolation for tobacco interests, demanding (oftentimes
successfully) that any government official or international
organization that has contact of any kind with the tobacco industry
must itself be shunned, isolated, and barred from participating in
FCTC proceedings. The goal of these advocates, of course, is to
substantially disincentivize both domestic governments and
international organizations from holding meetings with or otherwise
listening to tobacco-affiliated interests, without regard to the topic
under discussion. Application of this policy has, for example, resulted
in the highly respected international law enforcement organization
Interpol being excluded from the FCTC’s implementation discussions
concerning the prevention of illicit trade in tobacco. 70 Despite the fact
that Interpol is perhaps the most prominent international organization
in the world seeking to put a stop to the deeply problematic illicit
trade in tobacco products, it has twice been denied credentials to
participate in FCTC discussions concerning illicit trade solely because
it occasionally cooperates with certain tobacco companies to track

68. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z46W-QW3C] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression”); art. 20 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association”); art. 21 (“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”), art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to
work”); art. 28 (“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”).
69. Lauren Southern, New attack on free speech in Delhi: Protesting tobacco farmers
rounded up outside UN conference, then “dropped off in the middle of nowhere,” REBEL
MEDIA (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.therebel.media/delhi_protesting_tobacco_farmers
_rounded_up_outside_un_conference [https://perma.cc/C6FM-M4YV] (archived Mar. 4,
2018).
70. FCTC, Possible amendments, supra note 42.
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shipments. 71 Whatever one may think of government cooperation
with the tobacco industry as a general matter, combating illicit trade is
clearly an area in which governments and the tobacco industry have a
synergy of interests that makes cooperation sensible and perhaps even
necessary. Tobacco product packaging and associated tracking
mechanisms play a key role in preventing illicit trade, 72 and there are
aspects of law enforcement policies designed to combat illicit trade
that necessarily require implementation by tobacco interests.
The sovereign rights of State Parties to the Convention have
enjoyed no immunity from the campaign to prevent industry
perspective from infiltrating FCTC proceedings. Many State Parties
to the Convention have state-run tobacco monopolies that play an
important part in those countries’ national tobacco control efforts. 73
Not only are those monopolies directly impacted by the policies set
forth in the Convention, but they also have a valuable perspective to
offer on many of the Convention’s key tobacco control initiatives,
including illicit trade. The Convention Secretariat let it be known
heading into COP7, however, that State Parties no longer (in its view)
enjoy the sovereign right to send delegates of their choosing to
negotiating sessions; the Secretariat recommended that any delegates
with ties to state-run tobacco monopolies or even links to tobacco
farmers be denied credentials and barred from participating in
negotiations. 74 The Secretariat further recommended that all delegates
and observers to COPs be required to fill out a “declaration of
interest” form that the Secretariat could use to sniff out individuals
that it deemed to be improperly affiliated with the tobacco industry
and designate them for exclusion. 75 This extraordinary proposal
actually sparked some resistance from several of the delegations at
COP7, which pointed out in response to the Secretariat’s proposal that
71. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], INTERPOL’s application for
the status of observer to the Conference of the Parties, FCTC/COP/6/4 (June 12, 2014),
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_4-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/94JN-KPPP]
(archived Mar. 4, 2018).
72. See, e.g., FCTC, supra note 1, art. 15 (requiring all parties to the FCTC to adopt
packaging and tracking measures to combat illicit trade in tobacco products).
73. For a WHO-published world map of state-run tobacco monopolies, which
“represent a combined consumption of 2 billion cigarettes or 40 percent of the world’s total
cigarette consumption,” see Tobacco Companies, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO],
http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/atlas18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D3X-PPHC] (archived Mar. 4,
2018).
74. FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32, ¶¶ 7-14.
75. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
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Article 5.3 in fact does not say anything at all about exclusion, bans
on participation, or limitations on the sovereign right to assemble
representative delegations. 76 The measure was accordingly tabled for
further discussion at COP8—at which time the Secretariat is expected
to take a second shot at using its considerable influence to push the
measure through. 77
The Article 5.3 Guidelines seek not only to isolate and exclude
tobacco interests from having any voice in policymaking, but also to
prohibit them from engaging in and publicizing activities that might
cause the public to view them in a favorable light. The FCTC itself
expressly imposes a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising for
all State Parties that are constitutionally able to do so. 78 The Article
5.3 Guidelines, however, purport to go substantially further, requiring
all State Parties to adopt measures to prevent the tobacco industry
from engaging in socially responsible activities, including corporate
social responsibility. 79 One report issued by the Convention
Secretariat, for example, deplores Japan Tobacco International’s work
with the ILO to “develop and implement activities that progressively
eliminate child labour and address conditions that drive tobacco
farmers to engage children in hazardous work.” 80 The same report
criticizes the UN Global Compact for accepting money from tobacco
interests “to promote responsible corporate citizenship as one way to
advance sustainable development,” and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees for recognizing British-American Tobacco’s efforts to
“generat[e] job opportunities for refugees.” 81 Multiple parties to the
Convention have been persuaded by this and other official documents
to enact bans on tobacco companies making charitable contributions
or engaging in corporate social responsibility. 82
The clear message: because it is essential that the public
understand that the tobacco industry is unequivocally evil,
76. FCTC, Report of the seventh session, supra note 52, ¶¶ 164-65, 167.
77. Id.
78. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 13.
79. Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶ 26-27 and Recommendations 6.1-6.3, at 7-8.
80. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], UN agencies and tobacco
industry interference: Examples of good practice from UN agencies, http://apps.who.int/fctc
/implementation/database/sites/implementation/files/documents/resources/UN%20agencies%2
0and%20tobacco%20industry%20interference.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7RZ-MUZT] (archived
Mar. 4, 2018).
81. Id.
82. CAI Roadmap, supra note 55, at 2.
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unprecedented steps must be taken to ensure that the industry is
prevented as a matter of law from using its financial resources to do
good. Whatever the merits of that idea, it is a rather curious
application of Article 5.3, which calls on parties only “to protect
[tobacco control] policies from commercial and other vested interests
of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.” 83 Such a
substantial interpretive leap, fraught with significant public policy
consequences, would not under normal processes for the
implementation of international law be accorded the imprimatur of
any kind of official status without first being subjected to rigorous
examination and debate. The Article 5.3 Guidelines, however, were
adopted at COP3 with virtually no meaningful discussion, in large
part because the “guidelines” were denominated non-binding, were
not supposed to impose new legal obligations under international law,
and were expressly noted to be “designed to assist Parties” in setting
tobacco control policy. 84 As described above, however, in practice the
Article 5.3 Guidelines have in fact been accorded a much more
substantive effect, and held up by partisans of all stripes—including
the sophisticated Secretariat —as embodying rock-ribbed obligations
that are binding on the State Parties to the Convention. The uses to
which the Article 5.3 Guidelines have subsequently been put counsel
in favor of much greater scrutiny by COP delegations of all future
efforts to elaborate through official channels the meaning of the
FCTC—including in particular COP7’s directive that the Secretariat
should prepare another working document for COP8 to further
develop the Article 5.3 Guidelines.
B.

Application of Article 5.3 to Achieve Purity and Isolation at the
National Level

The Article 5.3 Guidelines were also intended to bar tobacco
interests from gaining access to national governments for purposes of
influencing domestic law policymaking. Although, as noted above,
the guidelines on this subject purport to be “recommendations” with
no binding effect, they in fact expressly urge all Parties “to use and
enforce mechanisms to ensure compliance with these guidelines, such
83. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 5.3, at 7.
84. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Decisions, (Feb. 16, 2009),
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC_COP2_DIV9-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJ23LXXY] (archived Mar. 19, 2018).
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as the possibility of bringing an action to court.” 85 One does not
“ensure compliance” with a guideline, or bring an action in court over
failure to implement a mere recommendation.
In fact, a campaign of litigation and intimidation has been
waged by advocates since the Article 5.3 Guidelines were first
published to leverage the self-declared “recommendations” into
practical mandates. For example, in September of 2014, the Youth
Smoking Prevention Foundation sued the government of the
Netherlands for its alleged failure to uphold Article 5.3 of the
FCTC. 86 The thrust of the complaint was that the Dutch government
had allowed tobacco companies to have input into lawmaking,
including through a non-public meeting that the minister of finance
accepted with tobacco interests. 87 The court in the Netherlands
ultimately agreed that such standard government practices as holding
informal meetings with constituents did not violate any provision of
the FCTC, including Article 5.3. 88 Advocates, however, were able to
claim a substantive victory in the end, as the litigation generated
immense public pressure and media attention concerning the
purported international law “obligations” that had allegedly been
violated, which influenced the Dutch government to adopt measures
severely limiting communications between government officials and
tobacco interests on a going-forward basis. 89
Other similar lawsuits have also been filed. All such court cases
brought to date have (correctly, in my view) been dismissed as
meritless. 90 The interest groups supporting them, however, continue
85. Id. ¶ 34 (emphasis added).
86. Dutch court loss produces a win, Framework Convention Alliance,
http://www.fctc.org/media-and-publications/media-releases-blog-list-view-of-all-313/industryinterference/1369-dutch-court-loss-produces-a-win
[https://perma.cc/M5LU-2VBP]
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2018).
87. See generally Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation v. Netherlands, Case
C/09/475711 E.C.R. [2015],
https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/litigation/2394/NL_Youth%20Smoking%20Pre
vention%20Found.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ49-VBW4] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).
88. Id.
89. Clarification of Interpretation of Article 5.3, Tabaknee, http://www.tabaknee.nl/
images/stories/docs/clarification_implementation_art5.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH2M-YTZF]
(archived Mar. 4, 2018).
90. See, e.g., Institute of Public Health v. Union of India, (2015) ILR (Del.),
https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/litigation/2390/IN_Institute%20of%20Public%2
0Health%20v.%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC5T-86KS] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (“[A]ll that
Article 5.3 thereof requires is the covenanting States to protect its policies from commercial
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law. The
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to seek to leverage the Article 5.3 Guidelines, both inside and outside
the courtroom, to persuade national governments to adopt measures
starkly singling out tobacco-affiliated interests for a unique form of
public policy isolation that deprives them both of any voice in
policymaking and of any access to those in positions with lawmaking
authority. 91
After years of observable practice, it is now also clear that the
radical campaign of secrecy and exclusion that the Convention
Secretariat and like-minded NGOs have been pursuing is, at times,
producing decidedly perverse policy outcomes. When efforts to end
child labor and to provide employment to refugees are sacrificed at
the altar of isolating and stigmatizing tobacco interests, when Interpol
is banned from participating in discussions about ending illicit trade
because of its perceived taint from innocuous collaboration with
tobacco companies on tracking their products, and when a resolution
urging that governmental regulations of e-cigarettes and vaping
devices should be supported by evidence-based science is voted down
out of concern that science would not support the desired regulatory
outcomes, 92 a re-examination of the implementation process that is
currently being employed is clearly called for. Indeed, it is
demanded.
VI. ESTABLISHED NORMS OF TRANSPARENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
To summarize the above, through the last several COPs, FCTC
policymaking has become increasingly non-transparent. The public
has been shut out. The media has been shut out. Organizations and
Guidelines issued thereunder (though in spite of our asking, we were not shown the power to
make the guidelines or anything to indicate that India has accepted the said guidelines) too
only require interaction with the tobacco industry on matters related to tobacco control or
public health to be accountable and transparent and do not prohibit the governments of the
covenanting States from participating in conferences even if sponsored/co-hosted by the
tobacco industry.”).
91. See, e.g., NGOs Issue Global Call On Namibia To Stand Strong Against Tobacco
Industry Bullying, Framework Convention Alliance, http://www.fctc.org/media-andpublications/media-releases-blog-list-view-of-all-313/industry-interference/628-ngos-issueglobal-call-on-namibia-to-stand-strong-against-tobacco-industry-bullying#sthash.BUDP5
nDC.dpuf [https://perma.cc/82HW-YVXX] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) (“Under . . . the global
tobacco treaty . . . and its Article 5.3 Guidelines[,] governments should refuse to . . . treat
tobacco corporations as ‘stakeholders’ in public health policy . . . [or] accept their so-called
corporate social responsibility schemes”).
92. FCTC, Report of the seventh session, supra note 52.
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individuals even remotely associated with tobacco interests have been
banned. And records of FCTC implementation deliberations have
been increasingly stripped bare, to the point that future COPs can be
expected to produce only summary reports for all subsidiary body
working groups, which will report on ultimate conclusions and
outcomes, but will not provide any means for the public, the media, or
affected groups to discern which organizations or delegations were
the primary drivers of the policies that were ultimately adopted, what
the supporting reasons were, who expressed dissenting views, or why
those views were overcome. 93
The increasing move towards non-transparency and exclusion at
the FCTC COPs is a stark departure from the norm for international
negotiations, and is entirely irreconcilable with the transparency
principles that the WHO and the Convention Secretariat themselves
espouse as an essential means of identifying and combating tobacco
industry machinations. The highly regarded International Law
Association has promulgated best practices for international
negotiations (called the Recommended Rules and Practices, or
“RRPs”) that are drawn from the experience of respected academics
and judges from a wide variety of states. 94 The RRPs provide that
“[n]ormative decisions of an [international organization, or “IO”]
should as a general rule be adopted by a public vote.” 95 They further
call for IOs to transparently state the reasons supporting all decisions
made: “Organs of an IO are under an obligation to state reasons for
their decisions,” and “[n]on-plenary organs should reflect in their
reports information of a non-confidential nature forming the basis of
their decisions.” 96 According to the RRPs, openness, transparency,
and objectivity are essential elements of a well-tuned international
negotiation process: “Non-plenary organs acting on behalf of the
whole membership under the governing provisions of an
[international organization] have a special obligation to act as
transparently as possible, and should reduce as far as possible the
number of non-public meetings.” 97 “An [international organization]

93. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94. INT’L L. ASS’N BERLIN CONF., Accountability of International Organizations, 1
INT’L ORG. L. REV. (2004).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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should conduct its institutional and operational activities in a manner
which is objective and impartial and can be seen to be so.”
The General Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps the most
widely known and respected international governing body in the
world, has demonstrated through decades of practice how well these
principles can operate. Article 60 of the UN General Assembly Rules
of Procedure is similar to the FCTC’s Article 32, and provides that
“the meetings of the General Assembly and its Main Committees
shall be held in public unless the organ concerned decides that
exceptional circumstances require that the meeting be held in private.
Meetings of other committees and subcommittees shall also be held in
public unless the organ concerned decides otherwise.” 98 While
meetings of the General Assembly are, on rare occasion, closed to
public observation for security reasons, the UN has demonstrated its
commitment to transparency in recent years by using modern
technology to stream nearly all General Assembly meetings on the
Internet. 99
Nor is the UN the only relevant example; openness and
transparency have also proven effective for implementing multilateral
framework conventions. COP21 of the Climate Change Framework,
for example, has been lauded as an immense success, in no small part
because it employed a process that valued inclusion, debate and
diversity of opinion. Proceedings were entirely open to journalists and
accredited intergovernmental bodies, 100 and the COP allowed
thousands of organizations to be accredited, including industry groups
representing a wide variety of viewpoints. 101 In addition, a large space
called the Climate Generations Area was set up at COP21 so that civil
society could openly share opinions, debate, and even (gasp!) attempt
to influence the Parties who were actively involved in the

98. Rules of Procedure, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/
ropga/mtgs.shtml [https://perma.cc/LJ98-4TTV] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
99. Meetings, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/meetings/
[https://perma.cc/K5CQ-NSL3] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
100. FAQS, Paris COP 21-CMP11, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/COP21-FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3TJ-YSU7] (archived Mar. 20,
2018).
101. The Role of the Business Sector in Climate Negotiations: Interview with Nils
Moussu, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index.
cfm?pg=newspage&item=151126 [https://perma.cc/VEB9-GBJ8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
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negotiations. 102 This investment in transparency and inclusion paid
dividends, allowing a level of agreement on sound policy to be
achieved at COP21 that had previously eluded the Climate Change
Framework. The FCTC and its implementing bodies would do well to
pay attention to the measurable level of real world success achieved
by this markedly different procedural approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FCTC is intended to pursue unquestionably noble public
health goals. Its implementation process, however, is deeply broken,
departs markedly from established norms of international law, and
needs to be fixed. The parties to the Convention should use the
opportunity presented by COP8 to correct their procedural course at
both the international and national levels.
At the international level, transparency and openness should be
restored to the work of the COP, with full confidence that sound
policies with a solid evidentiary basis will prevail in an open
exchange of ideas. And at the level of domestic law implementation,
the guidelines interpreting Article 5.3 should be revisited and revised
to ensure faithfulness to the provision’s text and the intent of the State
Parties that negotiated it. Indeed, such a review is contemplated by
the guidelines themselves, which state that they “should be reviewed
and revised periodically to ensure that they continue to provide
effective guide… .” 103
What might revised Article 5.3 guidelines look like? A detailed
exegesis is beyond the scope of this article, but certain core principles
emerge from a review of relevant international instruments and
practice. The implementation of domestic tobacco control policy
should, of course, be protected from illicit practices such as bribery
and corruption. Transparency measures that allow economic conflicts
of interest to be recognized and taken into account by policymakers
also have an established pedigree and have proven highly effective.
What should be avoided, however, is a continuation of the campaign
of secrecy and exclusion that has characterized the last eight years of
Article 5.3 implementation. The continued use of such a broken and
102. Climate Generations Areas’ Official Opening, Paris COP21-CMP11,
http://archive.epi.yale.edu/the-metric/scenes-paris-beyond-climate-negotiations
[https://perma.cc/TYC6-JEYF] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
103. Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶ 37.
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exclusionary policymaking process will serve only to destabilize
established norms for the creation of international law, and if history
is any guide in the long run will in the long run undermine the
efficacy of public health outcomes.

